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Three times in the past five years, the Supreme Court has issued deci-
sions interpreting the civil remedy provisions of the Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO).1 Yet none of these decisions an-
swers a threshold question: When does a civil RICO cause of action ac-
crue? 2 Indeed, the Court explicitly sidestepped the issue in a case in
which it decided the related issue of the length of RICO's statute of limi-
tations.' But a provision limiting the period of time in which an action
may be brought is of no help unless a court knows when a cause of action
under RICO accrues, and therefore when the four year limitations rule
begins to run.4
A brief description of the RICO statute illustrates the complexity of the
accrual issue as it relates to the RICO cause of action.5 RICO prohibits
four types of activity:6 (1) the investing of monies earned through racke-
1. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1988). For decisions, see infra note 2.
2 For the purposes of this Note, "accrual" refers to the point at which a cause of action may be
maintained. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 19 (5th ed. 1987) (defining "accrue"). The statute of limita-
tions for the relevant action begins to run when the cause of action accrues. Id. at 835.
The recent Supreme Court decisions on RICO are: H.J., Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 109 S.
Ct. 2893 (1989) (interpreting statute's pattern requirement); Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff
& Assocs., 483 U.S. 143 (1987) (four year limitations provision from Clayton Act applies to RICO);
Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479 (1985) (prior conviction for criminal violation of RICO
not necessary to maintain civil RICO action).
3. Agent Holding, 483 U.S. at 157. The Court supplied RICO with a four year limitations
provision based on the Clayton Act, id. at 150-54, 156, but stated that because the earliest date the
cause of action could have accrued in Agency Holding was well within the four year limitations period
adopted in the decision, there was no need to decide the appropriate time of accrual for a civil RICO
claim. Id. at 156-57.
4. The start of a limitations period and the accrual of a cause of action are terms used synony-
mously by most courts. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 321, 338, reh'g
dhanid, 401 U.S. 1015 (1971); Clay v. Union Carbide Corp., 828 F.2d 1103, 1105 (5th Cir. 1987);
Federal Say. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Haralson, 813 F.2d 370, 376 (11th Cir. 1987); Spannaus v.
United States Dep't of Justice, 824 F.2d 52, 56 (D.C. Cir. 1987). But see Volk v. D.A. Davidson &
Co., 816 F.2d 1406, 1412 (9th Cir. 1987) (in case where fraud is alleged, claim accrues when plaintiff
suffers injury, but statute of limitations does not begin to run until claim is discovered). In this Note,
the two terms will be used synonymously.
5. Although RICO was passed in 1970, it was not until a decade later that use of the private civil
damages remedy proliferated. Before 1980 there were only nine reported decisions involving civil
RICO. After 1980 the number grew geometrically. See Task Force Report on Civil RICO, A.B.A.
SEC. CORP. BANKING AND BUSINESS LAW, REPORT OF THE AD Hoc CIVIL RICO TASK FORCE 55
(1984) [hereinafter Task Force Report) (in database of approximately 270 published and unpublished
Federal civil RICO cases that existed in 1984, 5 were decided in 1980, 19 in 1981, 35 in 1982, 89 in
1983, and 116 in 1984).
6. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a)-(d) (1988).
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teering activities' in an enterprise engaged in interstate commerce; (2) us-
ing proceeds from the collection of an unlawful debt to make a similar
investment; (3) conducting an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering
activity; and (4) conspiring to violate any of the above prohibitions.
As nearly all civil RICO complaints allege the third prohibition as their
predicate act,' the elements of a claim in most RICO cases consist of:9 (1)
an injury10 (2) resulting from the conduct of an enterprise,"' (3) through a
pattern (4) of racketeering activity. It is the interaction of the injury re-
quirement with the pattern element of RICO, defined as requiring plain-
tiff to allege "at least two acts of racketeering activity . . .within ten
years . . . after the commission of a prior act of racketeering activity,"' 2
that makes accrual under RICO so problematic.
On the face of the statute, it is unclear whether plaintiff's cause of ac-
tion accrues upon injury resulting from one act of such pattern or whether
the claim accrues after plaintiff can allege a pattern of racketeering activ-
ity. 3 For example, suppose plaintiff is one of several victims harmed by
defendant's scheme to defraud a group of investors. Under some courts'
interpretations, the statute of limitations begins to run after plaintiff sus-
tains an injury from one act, even though he may be unaware of other
injuries sustained by other victims and consequently unable to allege a
pattern.' 4 Alternatively, some courts effectively have deferred accrual until
plaintiff is able to allege a pattern.' 5 Federal courts' practice of deferring
accrual of a Federal cause of action until plaintiff knows, or in exercise of
reasonable diligence should know, of the injury' 6 adds more variables to
the problem. Finally, the relationship of the four-year statute of limita-
tions to the requirement that the predicate acts occur within ten years of
each other provides another layer of uncertainty.
The variation in rules of accrual, moreover, results in widely differing
outcomes for plaintiffs. Under some courts' interpretations of RICO ac-
7. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1988) (defining racketeering activities to include such offenses as bribery,
arson, extortion, and threats to commit any of above, as well other activities already criminalized
elsewhere in U.S. Code, such as securities fraud, mail and wire fraud, embezzlement, and obstructing
Federal investigation).
8. See Task Force Report, supra note 5, at 55 (97% of all civil RICO actions brought under 18
U.S.C. § 1962(c)).
9. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496 (1985); Keystone Ins. Co. v. Houghton, 863
F.2d 1125, 1129 (3d Cir. 1988) (elements of civil RICO).
10. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1988).
11. An enterprise includes "any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal
entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity." 18 U.S.C.
§ 1961(4) (1988).
12. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1988).
13. RICO's civil remedy provision permits suit by persons "injured in their business or property."
18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1988). The civil remedy section is thus silent on how the pattern element
required by § 1962(c) relates to § 1964(c).
14. See discussion of discovery rules and cases cited infra notes 65-87 and accompanying text.
15. See discussion of last predicate act rule infra notes 87-96 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 66-70 and accompanying text.
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crual, a plaintiff who is injured in 1980, discovers the injury in 1984, but
does not discover a second injury until 1990 would be unable to recover
for the 1984 injury, even though he suffered two injuries occurring within
ten years of each other, the base line requirement for a RICO claim.1"
The 1984 discovery triggers the four year limitations rule, so plaintiff be-
comes time barred in 1988, before he can allege a pattern that includes
the 1990 injury. Other courts would defer accrual of the cause of action
until plaintiff can allege a pattern. Under this view, plaintiff who files his
claim in 1990 could recover for the entirety of acts taking place during
1980-90. s
Currently, four different rules defining when a RICO cause of action
accrues exist among the lower courts. 9 Despite the seeming abundance of
choices, courts faced with this issue have, in fact, few principles to guide
them in their decisions. Unlike limitations provisions, for which courts
have developed a body of Federal common law2" to guide them through a
17. This hypothetical example makes several assumptions. First, it assumes that RICO provides
the plaintiff's only colorable claim. Though time barred under RICO, plaintiff may still be able to
recover for an individual injury under another cause of action, depending upon the limitations rules of
that action. Second, the hypotheticals in this Note assume that two racketeering acts occurring within
ten years of each other constitute a pattern. The Supreme Court has held that such a fact situation
may, but need not, constitute a pattern. See H.J., Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 109 S. Ct. 2893,
2895-96 (1989); Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496 n.14 (1985).
For a case in which plaintiff is unable to recover under RICO for the first injury if it occurs more
than four years before the second injury, see State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Ammann, 828 F.2d 4
(9th Cir. 1987) (discovery of each injury triggers four year statute of limitations beyond which plain-
tiff may not recover for such injury, though such injury may be used to establish pattern).
18. County of Cook v. Berger, 648 F. Supp. 433, 435 (N.D. Ill. 1986) ("[S]o long as any of the
predicate acts occur within the limitations period, a defendant should have to answer for all of his
related and c6ntinual acts of harm.").
19. While as many as five distinct rules for RICO accrual have existed, the current battle seems
to be between two types of rules. Compare Bankers Trust Co. v. Rhoades, 859 F.2d 1096 (2d Cir.
1988), cerl. denied sub nor. Soifer v. Bankers Trust Co., 109 S. Ct. 1642 (1989) and State Farm
Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Ammann, 828 F.2d 4 (9th Cir. 1987) (new cause of action accrues each time
plaintiff discovers new injury in pattern) with Keystone Ins. Co. v. Houghton, 863 F.2d 1125 (3d Cir.
1988); Charter Oak Ins. Co. v. Domberg, No. 83-4522 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 3, 1987) (WESTLAW DCT
database); Citicorp Say. of I11. v. Streit, No. 84-7471 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 6, 1987) (WESTLAW DCT
database); Perta v. Comprehensive Accounting Corp., No. 84-5484 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 23, 1987)
(WESTLAW DCT database); Newman v. Wanland, 651 F. Supp. 20 (N.D. Il1. 1986); County of
Cook v. Berger, 648 F. Supp. 433 (N.D. 11. 1986) (statute of limitation begins to run with occurrence
of last act in pattern of violative acts required by RICO). For courts applying the discovery rule, see
Pocahontas Supreme Coal Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 828 F.2d 211 (4th Cir. 1987), affg
Compton v. Ide, 732 F.2d 1429 (9th Cir. 1984); La Porte Constr. Co. v. Bayshore Nat'l Bank, 805
F.2d 1254, 1256 (5th Cir. 1986); Bowling v. Founders Title Co., 773 F.2d 1175, 1178 (11th Cir.
1985), cert. denied sub nom. Zoldessy v. Founders Title Co., 475 U.S. 1109 (1986) (also affirming
Compton); Alexander v. Perkin Elmer Corp., 729 F.2d 576 (8th Cir. 1984) (applying state rule of
accrual stating that plaintiff time barred if has sufficient knowledge of injury five years before filing
claim, even if discovers more acts later).
For two other distinct views, apparently not adopted by any other courts, see Keystone Ins. Co. v.
Houghton, 692 F.Supp. 466, 470-473 (E.D. Pa. 1988), rev'd, 863 F.2d 1125 (3d Cir. 1988) (cause of
action accrues to plaintiff when he discovers last act in pattern of violation), Armbrister v. Roland
Int'l Corp., 667 F. Supp. 802 (M.D. Fla. 1987) (holding that statute of limitations begins to run with
occurrence of first act of pattern). See also discussion of Armnbrister, infra notes 104-11. For classifi-
cation of these rules, see infra note 64 and accompanying text.
20. It is generally accepted that Federal courts have competence to declare as a matter of common
law, or judicial legislation, rules which may be necessary to fill in the interstices or otherwise give
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maze of issues,21 no similar body of law governs accrual. Though no less a
matter of Federal law,22 accrual questions rarely present any dilemmas.
In most cases, when a statute requires only a single injury, the general
Federal rule of accrual, which postpones the commencement of the limita-
tions period until plaintiff discovers the injury, proves adequate. With
RICO, however, the use of the general Federal rule-known as the dis-
covery rule-as the sole rule of accrual presents the difficulties described
above.2
3
Federal courts have yet to develop any consistent principles for deter-
mining a rule of accrual in the cases when the discovery rule is unsatisfac-
tory. Part I of this Note, after setting forth the need for a uniform rule of
accrual, will propose such guidelines based on Federal principles gov-
erning accrual and on general Federal common law principles. Part II of
the Note will then evaluate the several rules in light of these guidelines.
I. A PROPOSED ANALYSIS FOR A UNIFORM RULE OF ACCRUAL
A. The Need for a Uniforin Rule of Accrual
An argument that the Supreme Court should resolve the question of
when a RICO cause of action accrues presupposes the need for a uniform
rule of accrual among the circuits. First, such an argument must distin-
guish between the need for a uniform set of principles for determining the
question of RICO accrual and the need for a single rule to be applied in
effect to statutes enacted by Congress. Mishkin, The Variousness of "Federal Law": Competence and
Discretion in the Choice of National and State Rules for Decision, 105 U. PA. L. RE,. 797, 800
(1957) (discussing Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)). Filling in a statute of limitations left
open by Congress in a Federal cause of action provides a good example of the existence of Federal
common law. Under this definition, which relies on competence to declare whether Federal or state
law should be applied rather than on which law is eventually applied, determining a missing limita-
tions provision is a matter of Federal common law even when a local rule is eventually deemed to
apply. Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., 483 U.S. 143 (1987) and its history illus-
trate that a Federal court's decision to apply state law is itself a Federal rule of decision. Prior to the
Agency Holding decision, courts had applied the most analogous limitations rule of the forum state.
See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 268 (1985) (actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) should apply
state limitations provisions for personal injury). Adopting a uniform Federal rule of limitations for
RICO was thus a departure from previous practice. The Agency Holding court, however, found com-
pelling reasons for departing from precedent. Citing the similarity of the provisions for private treble
damages actions found in both the Clayton Act and in RICO, the general intent of RICO's drafters to
pattern the statute after the Clayton Act, and the need for a uniform rule of accrual to prevent forum
shopping, the Court concluded that the Clayton Act "provides a far closer analogy [to RICO] than
any available state statute." Agency Holding, 483 U.S. at 156. See generally Comment, The Parame-
ters of Federal Common Law: The Case of Time Limitations of Federal Causes of Action, 136 U. PA.
L. REv. 1447 (1987) (discussing Agency Holding in the context of Federal jurisprudence on statutes
of limitation).
21. See, e.g., Agency Holding, 483 U.S. at 156 (issues include whether to apply Federal or local
rule and which of several competing local rules should apply).
22. Accrual is a matter of Federal common law in that Federal law is applied to determine when
a Federal right of action accrues. See Deary v. Three Un-Named Police Officers, 746 F.2d 185, 197
n.16 (3d Cir. 1984). Even when a state statute of limitations applies, Federal law determines when
the statute of limitations begins to run. Compton, 732 F.2d at 1433.
23. See supra text accompanying notes 17-18.
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every case. Whether or not the latter may be appropriate for such a di-
verse and multi-faceted action as RICO, a set of principles outlining an
approach to accrual issues would provide a unitary standard for RICO
accrual and guide the shaping of accrual rules for other Federal causes of
action.24 Second, in its decision to establish a uniform statute of limitations
for RICO, the Court expressed a desire for uniformity among the states,
for an end to forum shopping, and for a reduction of litigation.2" These
rationales also support the need for a uniform rule of accrual for RICO.
Finally, the need to reduce the vagueness of the RICO statute cannot be
overstated. Courts repeatedly have attempted to solidify the statute's many
ill-defined terms. For example, at the Supreme Court's direction, most
lower courts in recent years have directed their attention to defining the
term "pattern."26 The Court's recent interpretation of "pattern" indicates
that it largely is to be considered case by case.27 Resolving uniformly
when a RICO cause of action accrues would provide an alternate, if cur-
rently overlooked, means of resolving RICO disputes at the pre-trial stage
without the need to divine the meaning of disputed terms.
Because the Court appears to be backing away from any judicial at-
tempt to limit RICO's scope where Congress fails to do so, 2 8 any argu-
ment in favor of resolving the accrual of a RICO action that is justified on
the basis of restricting claims at the outset should be viewed with caution.
Yet the interpretation of any of RICO's terms necessarily results in re-
striction; a new definition will exclude some meanings. Moreover, a
court's authority to interpret accrual, a matter omitted from the RICO
statute, is greater than its authority to restrict terms explicitly set forth in
the statute. Determining accrual for a Federal cause of action is a gap-
closing function traditionally filled by courts; restriction of the statute
through the choice of one rule of accrual over another poses less of a
24. Examples of other areas of law in which accrual remains uncertain include antitrust and
conspiracy, as well as employment discrimination under Title VII. See, e.g, Held v. Gulf Oil Co., 684
F.2d 427 (6th Cir. 1982) (accrual of Title VII claim); Smith v. American Presidential Airlines, Ltd.,
571 F.2d 102 (2d Cir. 1978) (same); Note, Complexities of Accrual: The Antitrust Statute of Limita-
tions in a Contractual Context, 31 UCLA L. REv. 1061 (1984) (antitrust accrual rules); Annotation,
When Does Statute of Limitations Begin to Run Against Civil Action or Criminal Prosecution for
Conspiracy? 62 A.L.R.2D 1369 (1958) (conspiracy accrual).
25. Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley Duff & Assocs., 483 U.S. 143, 148, 154 (1987).
26. See H.J., Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 109 S. Ct. 2893 (1989); Sedima, S.P.R.L. v.
Imrcx Co., 473 U.S. 479 (1985). For a discussion of lower court cases interpreting RICO's pattern
requirement prior to the Northwestern Bell case, see Note, Clarifying a "Pattern" of Confusion: A
Multi-Factor Approach to Civil RICO's Pattern Requirement, 86 MiC. L. REv. 1745, 1754-60
(1988), Note, Interpreting RICO's "Pattern of Racketeering Activity" Requirement After Sedima:
Separate Schemes, Episodes or Related Acts?, 24 CAL. W.L. REV. 1, 8-25 (1988).
27. Northwestern Bell, 109 S. Ct. at 2902.
28. Id. at 2900; see also Sedima, 473 U.S. at 498; Keystone Ins. Co. v. Houghton, 863 F.2d 1125,
1128 (3d Cir. 1988); Comment, All the Myriad Ways: Accrual of Civil RICO Claims in the Wake of
Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff, 48 LA. L. REv. 1411, 1421, 1425 & n.56 (1988).
1990] 1403
The Yale Law Journal
threat of "judicial legislation" than does an effective rewriting of the stat-
ute's explicit terms. 9
B. Procedure for Deriving a Rule of Accrual
A combination of statutory interpretation and Federal common law de-
termines when a Federal cause of action accrues.30 Absent any discussion
of accrual in the statute or legislative history,3' a court must turn to judi-
cial interpretations of analogous issues.
Statutes of limitation present such an analogous issue. Both accrual and
limitations provisions are matters of statutory interpretation. Rules of ac-
crual are integral to limitations rules, as a limitation rule cannot be ap-
plied until the question of when the limitations period begins to run is
determined. 2 Similarly, just as courts determining a missing statute of
limitations must weigh plaintiff's rights against those of the defendant, 33
so courts determining when a cause of action accrues must consider such a
balance. The analysis developed in Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley Duff
& Associates34 to determine RICO's statute of limitations therefore pro-
vides a model for determining an appropriate rule of accrual.
1. The Agency Holding Procedure for Determining a Statute of
Limitations
The Agency Holding Court sets out a two-part analysis for determining
a statute of limitations. The first step requires finding an analogous cause
of action from either state or Federal law. 5 This part of the procedure
involves "characterizing the claim," that is, determining the overall nature
of the claim (e.g., fraud, personal injury) to find the cause of action most
29. For examples of Federal courts imposing rules of accrual of varying degrees of strictness in
the antitrust context, see Note, supra note 24, at 1066-74 (discussing cases).
30. Ross v. Johns-Manville, 766 F.2d 823, 826 (3d Cir. 1985) (accrual is matter of statutory
construction of statute of limitations); see Deary v. Three Un-Named Police Officers, 746 F.2d 185,
197 n.16 (3d Cir. 1984) (accrual is matter of Federal common law). The line between Federal com-
mon law and statutory interpretation is blurred. Recent commentators have settled on a definition that
recognizes the link between the two functions:
The difference between "common law" and "statutory interpretation" is a difference in em-
phasis rather than a difference in kind. The more definite and explicit the prevailing legislative
policy, the more likely a court will describe its lawmaking as statutory interpretation; the less
precise and less explicit the perceived legislative policy, the more likely a court will speak of
common law.
Westen & Lehman, Is There Life for Erie After the Death of Diversity? 78 MICH. L. REV. 311, 332
(1980); see also P. BATOR, D. MELTZER, P. MISHKIN & D. SHAPIRO, HART & WECHSLER'S THE
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 863 (3d ed. 1988) ("Statutory interpretation shades
into judicial lawmaking on a spectrum, as specific evidence of legislative purpose with respect to the
issue at hand attenuates.").
31. See Ex Parte Collett, 337 U.S. 55, 61 (1949) ("[Tlhere is no need to refer to the legislative
history where the statutory language is clear.").
32. See cases cited supra note 4.
33. See cases cited infra note 50.
34. 483 U.S. 143 (1987).
35. Id. at 156.
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analogous to it.36 The second step considers whether the Federal policies
at stake or the practicalities of the litigation require altering the rule
based on the initial characterization."
2. Characterizing the Claim for Purposes of Accrual
A court faced with determining an appropriate rule of accrual would
first "characterize" the claim." The first step in the analysis should con-
sider whether the RICO claim is characterized best as (1) an action to
recover for a continuing violation,39 or (2) an action to recover for harms
caused by particular predicate acts, many of which are kept secret from
the plaintiff at the time of injury."' If RICO is primarily an action to
recover for a continuing violation, then the claim should not accrue until
the plaintiff can allege a pattern. But if compensating injury was the main
concern of the RICO drafters, then the claim should accrue upon injury
or when plaintiff becomes aware of such injury.
Neither characterization is entirely satisfactory. The pattern require-
ment suggests the RICO action is similar to a continuing violation, but
the nature of the predicate acts suggests that RICO is similar to an action
to recover for fraud. The Agency Holding decision provides support for
this dual nature of RICO. The Court held that the predicate acts that
establish racketeering activity under RICO are "far-ranging, and cannot
be reduced to a single generic characterization.""'
The fact that no single characterization applies calls for an accrual rule
that takes account of the several possible characterizations of RICO. Yet
of the several characterizations, that of RICO as a continuing violation
36. Id; see Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 268 (1985) ("The characterization of § 1983 for
statute of limitations purposes is derived from the elements of the cause of action, and Congress'
purpose in providing it."); see also UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 706 (1966)
(determining limitations period for claims arising under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations
Act by "characterization").
37. Agency Holding, 483 U.S. at 147-48 (Federal policies might justify deviation from presump-
tion that state limitations period applies).
38. The Agency Holding court's consideration of various characterizations of the RICO claim for
the purpose of determining the statute of limitations provides some guidance for characterizing the
claim for accrual purposes. In the statute of limitations context, debate revolved around whether the
appropriate period should be identified by directly analogizing the predicate offenses to the causes of
action listed in states' general statutes of limitations or by characterizing the entire RICO cause of
action as a matter of Federal law and then ascertaining an analogous statutory period. Comment,
sup/ra note 20, at 1481.
39. E.g., County of Cook v. Berger, 648 F. Supp. 433, 434 (N.D. Ill. 1986); see infra notes
91-95 and accompanying text.
40. This is the characterization implicitly assumed by those courts applying the discovery rule.
Although RICO does specifically outlaw conspiracies to violate the substantive provisions of
the statute ... RICO's civil remedy section permits suit by persons injured in their businesses
or property .. The civil remedy provision's focus upon injury as opposed to existence of a
conspiracy suggests that the normal federal rule on accrual should apply ..
Compton v. Ide, 732 F.2d 1429, 1433 (9th Cir. 1984).
41. Agency Holding, 483 U.S. at 143, 152; see also Malley-Duff & Assoc. v. Crown Life Ins.
Co., 792 F.2d 341, 348 (3d Cir. 1986) (RICO concepts such as "enterprise," "pattern," and "racke-
teering activity" "simply unknown" to common law).
The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 99: 1399
stands out. The Court in Agency Holding held that the Clayton Act pro-
vides the closest analogy to RICO.42 Actions under the Clayton or Sher-
man Acts do not require a pattern, but antitrust law has recognized the
ongoing nature of antitrust violations. While an antitrust action normally
accrues when defendant commits an act that injures plaintiff's business,43
courts have carved out an exception to this accrual rule in the case of a
continuing violation."' In such a case, each violative act triggers a new
limitations period.45 The plaintiff may recover only for those acts that
occurred in the four years immediately preceding the filing of the claim.46
RICO too can be characterized as an action to recover for a continuing
violation. Congress enacted RICO to prevent the infiltration of legitimate
businesses by organized crime.47 The desire to remedy the gradual process
of such infiltration suggests a legislative intent to create a remedy for an
ongoing harm analogous to a continuing violation.48
3. Federal Policies to be Weighed in a Rule of Accrual
In addition to characterization, the analysis also should consider any
Federal policies or practicalities of litigation that may, when weighed
against the characterization, alter the calculus. One such Federal policy is
the near universal application of the discovery rule of accrual to any Fed-
eral cause of action.49 Another consideration is the achievement of a bal-
ance between plaintiffs' and defendants' rights, a policy derived from the
statute of limitations context.50
Because the discovery rule does not apply to antitrust law,51 a strict
42. Agency Holding, 483 U.S. at 150.
43. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 321, 338, reh'g denied, 401 U.S.
1015 (1971).
44. Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach., 392 U.S. 481, 495 (1968) (approving damages
award based on continuing violation); Hennegan v. Pacifico Creative Serv., 787 F.2d 1299, 1300 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 886 (1986) (continuing violation occurs when plaintiff's interests repeat-
edly invaded; cause of action arises each time plaintiff injured); see infra note 88. See generally 54
C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 203 (1987) (continuing violation rule applies when plaintiff alleges
continuing conspiracy to violate antitrust laws or, in absence of conspiracy, when defendant commits
act which by its nature is continuing antitrust violation).
45. Zenith Radio, 401 U.S. at 338.
46. Id.
47. Bradley, Racketeers, Congress and the Courts: An Analysis of RICO, 65 IOWA L. Rv. 837,
840-45, 892 (1980).
48. See, e.g., County of Cook v. Berger, 648 F. Supp. 433, 435 (N.D. Ill. 1986).
49. See infra note 65 and accompanying text.
50. Agency Holding, 483 U.S. at 156 (statute of limitations must reflect "congressional balancing
of the competing equities unique to civil RICO actions"); Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 275 (1985)
(balancing uniformity, certainty, minimization of unnecessary litigation); see also United States v.
Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117 (1979) (statute of limitations represents judgment that it is unjust not to
put adversary on -notice to defend within specified length of time and that right to be free of stale
claims comes to prevail over right to prosecute them) (citation omitted). The same considerations seem
to apply to determining a rule of accrual as a necessary procedure for the application of the statute of
limitations. See 54 C.J.S., supra note 44, § 81.
51. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 321, 338, reh'g denied, 401 U.S.
1015 (1971); Pace Indus. v. Three Phoenix Co., 813 F.2d 234, 237 (9th Cir. 1987); see also 54
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adoption of the continuing violation rule of accrual based on antitrust law
would not include any time for the plaintiff to discover his or her harm.
Rather, the statute of limitations begins to run with the occurrence of
each violative act, regardless of when plaintiff discovers it.52 Yet, in the
case of RICO, the rationales behind the development of the discovery rule
as the general Federal rule may compel the application of discovery
principles.
The discovery rule first was applied as the general Federal rule of ac-
crual in cases involving fraud.53 Notions of equity incorporated in the
Federal rules may account for the later expansion of the rule to non-fraud
Federal actions.54 Beyond general notions of equity, the discovery rule's
origins in fraud cases argue for the application of discovery principles to a
RICO action. Unlike the Clayton Act, which targets harms to competition
induced by force rather than by fraud, racketeering injuries by definition
include harms from fraud (securities, wire or mail fraud) and harms re-
sulting from force (e.g., extortion)." Therefore, Federal judicial practice
as well as legislative policies demand that courts make some allowance for
the plaintiff alleging fraud. By running the statute of limitations from the
discovery of the harm, rather than from the occurrence of each violative
act, the accrual rule will account adequately for those respects in which
RICO is not analogous to the Clayton Act.
Just as the plaintiff has the right to a reasonable time in which to bring
his claim, so a defendant enjoys the right eventually to be free of stale
claims.56 Courts must take defendant's right into account as another Fed-
eral policy to consider in deriving a rule of accrual. While a rule of ac-
crual that allows recovery for all acts in an alleged pattern of racketeer-
ing-including those outside the limitations period-would not be
unprecedented,57 such a rule would appear to encroach on defendant's
right eventually to be free of old claims.
RICO's characterization as a continuing violation, however, suggests
that the injury resulting from the pattern of acts is indivisible and there-
CJ.S., supra note 44, § 203 (cause of action under Clayton and Sherman Acts accrues with commis-
sion of act but statute of limitations in conspiracy to violate antitrust laws accrues with each separate
injurious act). But cf. infra notes 60-63 and accompanying text (discussing use of equitable tolling
doctrine of fraudulent concealment in antitrust law).
52. Ste cases cited supra note 51.
53. See Bailey v. Glover, 88 U.S. (21 Wall) 342, 348 (1874).
54. See Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 397 (1945); Moviecolor Ltd. v. Eastman Kodak
Co. 288 F.2d 80, 83 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 821 (1961).
55. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1988) (defining racketeering activities to include embezzlement as well
as securities, mail and wire fraud). Inherent in injury based on fraud is an inability to discover the
injury. BLACK'S LAW DICrTONARY 594 (5th ed. 1979). An accrual rule for RICO should therefore
allow plaintiff time to discover his injury.
56. United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117 (1979).
57. See, e.g., Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 295 (2d Cir. 1979), cert.
dt nied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980) (under Sherman Act, it is not necessary for act itself to have been
committed within limitations period if extent of damages is speculative; no unfairness in depriving
monopoly of fruits of unlawful conduct even though monopoly originated outside limitations period).
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fore that recovery of all damages is not an undue encroachment on defend-
ant's rights.5" Moreover, the intersection of the definition of a pattern
with the elements of a RICO cause of action places an outside limit on
what plaintiff can recover outside the four year limitations period. To
constitute a pattern under the statutory definition, acts must have occurred
within ten years of each other. 9 Thus, even if he can recover for injuries
that took place more than four years ago, plaintiff will not be able to
recover for any acts that took place more than ten years before the most
recent alleged act.
C. The Precedent for a Hybrid Rule: The Equitable Rule of Fraudu-
lent Concealment
The preceding section has shown that principles used to determine
RICO's statute of limitations all indicate that an accrual rule for RICO
should (1) recognize RICO's nature as an ongoing harm; (2) allow plain-
tiff time to discover his injury before his RICO claim accrues; and (3)
while keeping in mind the balance between plaintiffis and defendant's
rights, allow plaintiff an opportunity to recover for some acts outside the
four year limitations period given that the injury is indivisible.
No monolithic rule can satisfy these requirements; RICO requires a
hybrid rule of accrual which combines continuing violation principles with
the discovery rule. The question then becomes whether past courts have
altered traditional accrual doctrines to arrive at a hybrid rule. The doc-
trine of fraudulent concealment, applied to toll the accrual of a cause of
action in antitrust law when the plaintiff can show the acts complained of
were concealed from him fraudulently, provides a compelling precedent.60
Though presented as a tolling doctrine rather than as a rule of accrual,
the doctrine of fraudulent concealment6' has the same effect on a cause of
58. In recovering for acts outside the limitations period, plaintiff is actually recovering for a con-
tinuous series of acts, a portion of which became manifest within the preceding four years. See Com-
ment, supra note 28, at 1416 n.26. In addition, in situations where there is a lag time between the
commission of the act and the realization of the injury, it may be hard to apportion an injury to a
particular act or to estimate the amount of liability on the date of discovery.
59. See supra text accompanying note 12.
60. Conmar Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., 858 F.2d 499 (9th Cir. 1988), cerl. denied sub non. USL
Corp. v. Conmar Corp., 109 S. Ct. 795 (1989); Moviecolor Ltd. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 288 F.2d 80
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 821 (1961). Unlike predicate acts under RICO, predicate acts under
the Clayton and Sherman Acts are not inherently fraudulent (that is, they do not involve misrepresen-
tation or omission, which would allow invocation of the discovery rule of accrual). But the predicate
acts required to state a claim under the antitrust laws-conspiracy to engage in the restraint of trade,
tying arrangements, and price discrimination-see 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 13(a), 13(d) & 13(e) (1982), con-
template agreements that are made in secret. Consequently, it is difficult for an antitrust plaintiff to
find evidence of a predicate act at the time act occurs.
61. A finding that the statute of limitations has tolled requires a showing of facts which remove its
bar of the action. 54 C.J.S., supra note 44, § 85. The difference between the doctrine of fraudulent
concealment and the discovery rule is the higher threshold that must be reached by the antitrust
plaintiff to invoke the tolling doctrine. The plaintiff must show an affirmative act on the part of the
defendant to conceal the harm from the plaintiff. Moviecolor, 288 F.2d at 88.
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action as the application of the discovery rule: both delay the running of
the limitations period. In antitrust law, if the plaintiff suffers a series of
harmful acts that constitutes a continuing violation, the occurrence of each
act triggers the accrual of a new cause of action.2 But if the plaintiff
could show that an occurrence of an injurious act was fraudulently con-
cealed from him, the start of the limitations period triggered by that act
would be tolled during the period of concealment, until the plaintiff dis-
covered or had reason to discover the harm."'
In short, RICO's accrual rule should be a hybrid rule; Federal courts
need not adhere to a single rule, but may develop a rule that combines
elements of various existing rules of accrual. Part II explains how courts
either seem unaware of the hybrid rule option or, if courts do advocate a
hybrid rule, fail to put forth a compelling rationale or cite a precedent for
such a rule.
II. THE CURRENT RULES FOR ACCRUAL: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE
There are currently as many as five rules for the accrual of a RICO
cause of action, depending on the degree of precision (or lack thereof) used
by courts in distinguishing among the various rules:"' the discovery rule,
the separate accrual discovery rule, the last predicate act rule, the last
predicate act discovery rule, and the Clayton Act rule. This Part sets forth
the several rules and determines which comports most closely with the
analysis of Part I.
A. Summary of Accrual Rules Currently Applied to RICO
The five rules for accrual currently in existence may be divided into
two broad groups. One group relies on the general Federal equitable prin-
ciple of allowing the plaintiff time to discover his injury before the limita-
tions period begins to run, and the other group derives from a Federal
principle of accrual in the case of a continuing violation. While some rules
rely on both principles to some extent, each rule treats one of the two as
its primary concern.
1. The Discovery Rule
The discovery rule is the general Federal rule of accrual-the method
which governs Federal causes of action in the absence of a specific desig-
62. See supra note 44.
63. Moviecolor, 288 F.2d at 80, 84, 86.
64. A commentator has grouped the rules into categories different from the ones employed in this
Note: the discovery rule, the last predicate act rule, the last injury discovery standard, and the Clayton
Act rule. Comment, supra note 28, 1413-21. The last injury discovery standard has been overruled
since the publication of the Comment. Keystone Ins. Co. v. Houghton, 692 F. Supp. 466 (E.D. Pa.
1988), rev'd, 863 F.2d 1125 (3d Cir. 1988). This Note substitutes the last predicate act discovery rule
for the last injury discovery rule.
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nation by Congress of another method. 5 Under the discovery rule, a claim
accrues when the plaintiff knows, or in the exercise of reasonable dili-
gence should know, of the injury which is the basis for his action.66
Courts applying the discovery rule to RICO hold that plaintiff's cause
of action accrues with the discovery of the first injury.67 This method may
clash with the pattern requirement. If the claim accrues after the first
injury but before the plaintiff can state a pattern, plaintiff may be time
barred before he can state a claim.68 To avoid this problem, plaintiffs in
these cases claimed to have suffered a single injury as the result of a
scheme of mail, wire, or securities fraud. 9
Despite these difficulties, many circuits have applied the discovery rule
to RICO.70 The rationales invoked in support of the discovery rule are (1)
that the discovery rule, as the general Federal rule of accrual, has the
most authority and is therefore the easiest to adopt in the absence of a
better rule;7' and (2) that the discovery rule works well when the RICO
action is brought in conjunction with another Federal cause of action that
will most likely use the discovery rule of accrual.7 2 These rationales are
not compelling, especially if in some cases the discovery rule bars a plain-
tiff before he can even state a claim.73 Because of this defect, the discovery
rule cannot be reconciled completely with the pattern requirement of
RICO and is therefore not the best accrual rule for RICO actions.
65. See, e.g., United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 115 (1979) (Federal Tort Claims Act);
Mullinax v. McElhenney, 817 F.2d 711, 717 (1lth Cir. 1987) (42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim accrues when
plaintiff knows or has reason to know of both injury and identity of perpetrator); Corwin v. Marney,
Orton Investments, 788 F.2d 1063, 1068 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied sub norm. van Caspel v.
Corwin, 109 S. Ct. 305 (1988) (securities fraud actions arising under § 10(b) of Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982)); Tate v. Eli Lilly & Co., 522 F. Supp. 1048, 1049 (M.D.
Tenn. 1981) (personal injury). But cf. Curran v. Time Ins. Co., 644 F. Supp. 967, 972 (D. Del.
1986) (citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 8106, 8119 (1974 & Supp. 1984)) (with exception of
asbestos cases, cause of action accrues at first date action could be brought, and ignorance of injury
does not delay running of statute). See generally text accompanying notes 53-54.
66. La Porte Constr. Co. v. Bayshore Nat'l Bank, 805 F.2d 1254, 1256 (5th Cir. 1986).
67. E.g., Gutfreund v. Christoph, 658 F. Supp. 1378 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (claim partially barred by
statute of limitations when plaintiff suffers multiple injuries).
68. See supra text accompanying notes 17-18.
69. See Comment, supra note 28, at 1414 (distinguishing single injury RICO claims, for accrual
purposes, from claims alleging multiple injuries).
70. Riddell v. Riddell Wash. Corp., 866 F.2d 1480, 1489-90 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Pocahontas Su-
preme Coal Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 828 F.2d 211, 220 (4th Cir. 1987), aff'g Compton v. Ide,
732 F.2d 1429, 1433 (9th Cir. 1984); La Porte Constr. Co. v. Bayshore Nat'l Bank, 805 F.2d 1254,
1256 (5th Cir. 1986); Bowling v. Founders Title Co., 773 F.2d 1175, 1178 (11th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied sub nor. Zoldessy v. Founders Title Co., 475 U.S. 1109 (1986) (affirming Compton, 732
F.2d at 1433); Alexander v. Perkin Elmer Corp., 729 F.2d 576, 577-78 (8th Cir. 1984) (applying
state rule of accrual and stating that plaintiff time barred if he has sufficient knowledge of injury five
years before filing claim, even if he discovers more acts later); Compton v. Ide, 732 F.2d 1429, 1433
(9th Cir. 1984).
71. See Compton, 732 F.2d at 1433.
72. Cf. Bowling, 773 F.2d at 1178.
73. See supra text accompanying notes 17-18.
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2. The Separate Accrual Discovery Rule
Some courts faced with the problem of fashioning an accrual rule when
plaintiffs allege multiple injuries have attempted to solve the conflict be-
tween the discovery rule and the pattern requirement by adopting a varia-
tion of the discovery rule that also treats the action as a continuing viola-
tion. This rule is known as the separate accrual discovery rule.74 Under
this variation, a new claim accrues-and a new four year limitations pe-
riod begins to run-each time the plaintiff becomes aware of a new in-
jury.75 In this way, the separate accrual discovery rule overcomes the flaw
in the discovery rule that a plaintiff, unable to discover the second injury
required to form a pattern under RICO, becomes time barred because the
statute of limitations began to run with the discovery of the first injury.
Yet the reasoning that the two courts bring to bear in support of the
benefits of the rule is insufficient. The opinion in State Farm Mutual
Insurance Co. v. Ammann, 7 by failing to distinguish its rule from the
Ninth Circuit case adopting the discovery rule, Compton v. Ide,77 never
makes clear that the separate accrual discovery rule overcomes the diffi-
culty of the discovery rule. The concurrence in Ammann, though it cites
an antitrust continuing violation case as precedent for the rule adopted,
does not offer any rationale for the continuing violation analogy. The con-
currence does not even point out that the rule adopted by the Ammann
court must deviate from a strict application of the continuing violation
rule and allow plaintiff time to discover his injury if it is to follow
Conptoni 8
74. Bankers Trust Co. v. Rhoades, 859 F.2d 1096 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied sub nor. Soifer v.
Bankers Trust Co., 109 S. Ct. 1642 (1989); State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Ammann, 828 F.2d 4,
5 (9th Cir. 1987) (Kennedy, J. concurring) (new cause of action accrues each time plaintiff discovers
new injury in pattern).
The Ammann court derives this new rule from analogizing a RICO action to an action to recover
for a continuing violation in antitrust law. Under the continuing violation rule in accrual of antitrust
law, each separate act committed by defendant triggers a new four year limitations period. See supra
notes 45-46 and accompanying text. The Amnann rule differs from the antitrust rule in that each
new discovery of an injury, as opposed to the mere occurrence of the injurious act, triggers a new
limitations period.
75. Ammann, 828 F.2d at 5 (Kennedy, J. concurring). To meet the pattern requirement, plaintiff
may allege acts occurring outside the limitations period, as long as such acts are within the ten year
statutory definition of pattern. Though he may allege acts outside the four year limitations period,
plaintiff may only recover for acts occurring inside the four year limitations period. Thus, a plaintiff
discovering injuries in 1980 and 1984 is not time barred as long as he files his claim before 1988.
Several subsequent opinions in other circuits have, however, failed to realize that the rule adopted in
Ammaun is distinct from the discovery rule. See, e.g., Riddell v. Riddell Wash. Corp., 866 F.2d 1480,
1489-90 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (stating that Bankers Trust court adopts discovery rule and citing earlier
C, mptun opinion adopting discovery rule, instead of Ammann opinion, for proposition that Ninth
Circuit applies discovery rule).
76. 828 F.2d 4 (9th Cir. 1987).
77. 732 F.2d 1429 (9th Cir. 1984).
78. Ammann, 828 F.2d at 5 ("the basis for our holding comes not from [Agency Holding] or
Conipton, but from Hennegan v. Pacifico Creative Serv., Inc. and Gibson v. United States") (cita-
tions omitted). Hennegan was an antitrust case. 787 F.2d 1299 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 886
(1986). Gibh.on was an action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 781 F.2d 1334 (9th Cir. 1986), cert.
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Nor does the analysis offered in Bankers Trust"9-the Second Circuit
opinion adopting the separate accrual discovery rule-explain its decision
to retain the principles of the discovery rule and also apply accrual princi-
ples from the context of a continuing violation. The court simply focuses
on the need to apply the discovery rule, pointing out that RICO is only
meant to compensate "persons injured in their business or property." 80
The court uses the injury requirement of RICO to argue that the discov-
ery rule of accrual must be a component of the new rule of accrual: Until
plaintiffs find out about their injury, they will not have a right to sue.
The opinion reasons that without a right to sue, "a civil RICO action
cannot be held to have accrued."'"
This argument proves too much. The Bankers Trust court is in fact
arguing that a statute's jurisdictional requirement of injury demands that
the discovery rule of accrual apply to every action. The Clayton Act has a
similar jurisdictional requirement, limiting the civil treble damages rem-
edy to those persons "injured in [their] business or property.""2 But as we
have seen, plaintiffs bringing actions under the Clayton Act are not usu-
ally afforded the benefit of discovery.83 If the Bankers Trust court's argu-
ment were correct, then it would follow that the discovery rule should
apply to the Clayton Act as well as to most other statutory as well as
common law actions. The court ignores the fact that other characteristics
of the statute-that many of the predicate acts establishing a RICO viola-
tion involve fraud-require the incorporation of discovery principles into
a RICO accrual rule.84
Moreover, the two courts adopting the separate accrual discovery rule
seem to have overlooked the implications of this rule for plaintiff's rem-
edy. Under the separate accrual discovery rule, plaintiff may only recover
damages for those acts that took place within the four years before he filed
his claim. This corollary for damages effectively diminishes any advan-
tages derived from allowing the plaintiff time to discover his injury: The
damages corollary put forth in the concurrence subtracts the time allowed
to discover the action from the four year statute of limitations.8 5
denied, 479 U.S. 1054 (1987). Both cases apply the continuing violation rule to a conspiracy. By
disavowing Compton, the Aininann court fails to acknowledge that part of its rule comes from
Compton. Similarly, by omitting the flaws of the discovery rule, the opinion fails to show why this
new hybrid rule should be adopted.
79. 859 F.2d 1096 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied sub non. Soifer v. Bankers Trust Co., 109 S. Ct.
1642 (1989).
80. Id. at 1102.
81. Id.
82. 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1988).
83. See supra. note 51.
84. See supra notes 53-55.
85. If the last act occurred in 1982, and the injury not discovered until 1984, plaintiff does not
have four years from the discovery of the injury in which to file a claim; if he waits until 1988, he will
be barred, as no injuries occurred after 1982. If he is to recover damages, he has only two years from
the time of discovery of the injury in which to bring his claim.
1412 [Vol. 99: 1399
1990] RICO Accrual 1413
The effective curtailment of the four year statute of limitations that re-
sults from the separate accrual discovery rule is indeed a serious flaw.
Because the Supreme Court has ruled that a four year limitations period
provides the best balance of plaintiffs' and defendants' rights, 6 and be-
cause most courts would support allowing the plaintiff time to discover his
cause of action in addition to the limitations period, 7 this flaw in the
separate accrual discovery rule seems fatal.
3. The Last Predicate Act Rule
Several district courts have eschewed altogether the application to
RICO of the general Federal rule, the discovery rule, opting instead for
an alternate rule borrowed from the more specific context of a continuing
violation under antitrust law." Under the last predicate act rule, plain-
tiffs claim accrues upon commission of the last act in the pattern of acts
required by RICO. Thus, in County of Cook v. Berger,9 plaintiff, who
alleged a conspiracy among several local officials to commit a series of
harms against him, was held not to be time barred because the most re-
cent injury occurred within the applicable limitations period preceding the
filing of the claim.9
The last predicate act rule, however, explicitly differs from the anti-
trust-based rule of continuing violations in the scope of the injuries for
which the plaintiff may recover. Under the Berger rule, the plaintiff may
recover damages for the entire pattern of RICO violations, even though
some acts may have occurred outside the limitations period-more than
four years earlier.9 ' In contrast, the rule as applied in antitrust law limits
86. See Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., 483 U.S. 143, 155-56 (1987) (five year
catch-all limitation for criminal actions "does not reflect any congressional balancing of the competing
equities unique to civil RICO actions").
87. See supra note 65.
88. See supra note 44. To take advantage of the continuing violation rule of accrual under anti-
trust law, the antitrust plaintiff must show that an "overt act" was committed by the wrongdoer
pursuant to a contract, a combination, or a conspiracy within the limitations period. KFC Corp. v.
Marion-Kay Co., 620 F. Supp. 1160, 1167 (S.D. Ind. 1985); see also Pace Indus. v. Three Phoenix
Co., 813 F.2d 234, 239 (9th Cir. 1987) (enforcement of illegal contract is overt act).
The concept of "overt act" derives from conspiracy law. It is based on the theory that a civil
conspiracy is only actionable where it results in an injury to the plaintiff; an overt act cannot be
established by evidence of a conspiracy alone, without any evidence of acts performed pursuant to that
conspiracy. Rose Hall, Ltd. v. Chase Manhattan Overseas Banking Corp., 494 F. Supp. 1139, 1160(D. Del. 1980) (opinion following reargument). In RICO, an overt act is defined as a predicate act
under 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1982) (defining "racketeering activity"). See Lewis ex rel. Nat'l Semicon-
ductor Corp. v. Sporck, 612 F. Supp. 1316, 1325 (N.D. Cal. 1985).
89. 648 F. Supp. 433, 435 (N.D. Ill. 1986).
90. Berger was decided before the Agency Holding decision in which the Supreme Court held that
courts should borrow the Clayton Act's four year limitations period and apply it to RICO. The
Berger court used a state limitations period. As the plaintiff did not allege any lag time between the
occurrence of the acts and the discovery of the injuries, the Berger court did not have occasion to
consider whether the last predicate act rule should allow time for the discovery of the injury. Presum-
ably, the rule, if true to its antitrust roots, would not allow for discovery. See supra note 51 and
accompanying text.
91. Berger, 648 F. Supp. at 434-35.
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damages to those acts that occurred within the four years before the filing
of the claim.2
The Berger court expressly viewed the pattern requirement of RICO as
the element that should above all determine the accrual of a RICO cause
of action.9 The court cited United States v. Field,94 a criminal RICO
case, as precedent for applying the continuing violation rule to RICO.
The Field court similarly stressed the pattern requirement as the reason
for borrowing the continuing violation rule from antitrust law. Berger
thus held that the continuing violation rule should apply to RICO because
"the language of [RICO], which makes a pattern of conduct the essence of
the crime, 'clearly contemplates a prolonged course of conduct.' "" The
opinion, however, fails to reconcile a rule of accrual that starts the statute
of limitations running at the last act in the pattern with the policies un-
derlying the RICO statute and the policy of the general Federal rule of
accrual, which allows for discovery of the injury.9" As demonstrated in
Part I, discovery principles should play an integral role in determining the
appropriate RICO accrual rule.
In conclusion, the chief fault of the last predicate act rule lies in its
arbitrariness. The plaintiff's recovery depends entirely on whether he dis-
covers the action in time. If he does happen to discover the requisite pat-
tern of injuries, he stands to gain a windfall of treble damages if the pat-
tern of injuries stretches back over time; an equally deserving plaintiff
who remains ignorant goes uncompensated.
92. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 321, 338, reh'g denied, 401
U.S. 1015 (1971) (in conspiracy to violate antitrust laws, new cause of action accrues with each
injurious act; as to damages, statute of limitations runs from commission of act, but future damages
will be allowed in some cases). In some antitrust cases, plaintiff can recover for acts taking place
outside the limitations period if damages from such acts became ascertainable only during the four
years preceding the filing of the claim. Program Eng'g, Inc. v. Triangle Publications, Inc., 634 F.2d
1188, 1193 (9th Cir. 1980).
93. In its analysis, the Berger court stressed the pre-eminence of the pattern requirement in the
RICO action: "Civil RICO was designed to protect those who have been harmed by a pattern of
illegal conduct. The Supreme Court has emphasized the need for continuity plus relationship in
determining the existence of a pattern of racketeering activity." Berger, 648 F. Supp. at 435 (citing
Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479 (1985)) (emphasis added).
94. 432 F. Supp. 55 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), affd mem., 578 F.2d 1371 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 439
U.S. 801 (1978).
95. Berger, 648 F. Supp. at 434 (quoting Field, 432 F. Supp. at 59) (citation omitted) (emphasis
added).
96. A commentator similarly believes that it is not necessary to incorporate discovery principles
into an accrual rule for RICO. See Comment, supra note 28, at 1426, 1433 (stating rule "workable in
all the circuits" and "most appropriate given the unique character of civil RICO"). The Comment
rests its conclusion on the assumption that the imbalance of equities in favor of the plaintiff will, in
most circuits, be limited by a very strict definition of pattern. Id. at 1426-27. In light of the Supreme
Court's recent decision interpreting the pattern requirement of RICO, and in particular holding that
a single scheme involving many acts could constitute a pattern, this premise is no longer valid. See
H.J., Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 109 S. Ct. 2893 (1989).
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4. The Last Predicate Act Discovery Rule
The most recently introduced accrual rule, the last predicate act discov-
ery rule, combines the advantages of the discovery-based rules with the
pattern-based last predicate act rule. Under the last predicate act discov-
ery rule, the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the plaintiff
discovers the last predicate act of the defendant. 7 To look at it from the
point of view of a court presented with a claim, an action is timely if the
plaintiff can allege that he discovered an act committed by the defendant
that is violative of RICO within the four years preceding the filing of the
claim.
Under this rule, unlike the separate accrual discovery rule, the last
predicate act need not have caused injury to the plaintiff. Thus, in Key-
stone Insurance Co. v. Houghton,98 the Third Circuit, reversing the dis-
trict court, held that plaintiff, an insurance company that was one of sev-
eral companies injured by defendant's pattern of defrauding insurers, was
not time barred if it could allege that it discovered that defendants had
committed a predicate act against one of the other companies within the
past four years.
In adopting the last predicate act discovery rule, the Keystone Insur-
ance court implicitly recognized the difficulty of characterizing RICO in
any one way. In contrast, when adopting the last predicate act rule, the
Berger court failed to recognize that many RICO claims can be character-
ized as fraud claims and that Federal common law requires the applica-
tion of discovery principles to such claims. The Ainmann court, while rec-
ognizing the importance of discovery principles, devised a rule that only
applied discovery principles to the discovery of the injury and not to the
discovery of the pattern. 9
While the Keystone Insurance court's rule is optimal according to the
principles established above1°0 in its characterization of the RICO claim,
the court fails to consider fully any other Federal policies before arriving
at the rule. As demonstrated above,10 1 the Federal policy that accrual and
limitations rules should reflect balancing of plaintiffs' and defendants'
rights merits consideration. The last predicate act discovery rule, by al-
97. See Keystone Ins. Co. v. Houghton, 863 F.2d 1125, 1130 (3d Cir. 1988). The Keystone Ins.
court does not hold that the last predicate act discovery rule should be the sole accrual rule for RICO.
Id. at 1130-31 (implying that discovery rule should apply in those cases where the injury to the
plaintiff is singlefold). For taxonomy's sake, this Note will treat the Keystone Ins. case as standing for
the proposition that the last predicate act discovery rule is the best rule of accrual for RICO.
98. Id. at 1130.
99. This view is in contrast to that espoused by the Keystone Ins. court. "RICO is a crime of
association, which is violated, inter alia, by 'any person ... associated with any enterprise ... the
activities of which affect ... commerce, conductling] ... [the] enterprise's affairs through a pattern
of racketeering.' Therefore the discovery rule must apply to the pattern element as well as the injury
element." Ke~stone Ins., 863 F.2d at 1130 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1988)).
100. See supra Part I.
101. Id.
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lowing plaintiff to recover for all acts committed by the defendant that
caused injury to the plaintiff, and not just those acts that occurred within
the four years prior to the filing of the claim, may tip the balance of
equities in favor of the plaintiff and should not be adopted without ex-
plicit consideration. Attempting to justify its adoption of the last predicate
act discovery rule, the court argued that allowing recovery for some acts
and not others based solely on the line drawn by the limitations period
would prove arbitrary.0 2 A better argument would have alluded to the
inherent temporal limitation imposed by the definition of pattern.10 3
5. The Clayton Act Rule
A fifth accrual standard, adopted by the district court in Armbrister v.
Roland International Corp.,"°4 results from the analogy of civil RICO to
the Clayton Act-developed in the Agency Holding case-as the sole fac-
tor for determining RICO accrual."0 5 With this analogy in mind, the
court chose the antitrust accrual rule that best fit the facts of the case.106
Armbrister involved a scheme among defendants to commit fraud in the
sale of land. Although the sales took place ten years before the filing of
the suit, plaintiffs were still making payments on the sales contract.1, 7
The court held that plaintiffs were time barred, analogizing their claim to
a body of injury-on-the-contract antitrust cases. When a plaintiff's anti-
trust injury stems from the carrying out of a contract, plaintiff's cause of
102. Keystone Ins., 863 F.2d at 1131 (Given "the federal interest in providing relief to those who
are injured by a continuous and related course of conduct, it would be incongruous to bar, on statute
of limitations grounds, recovery for predicate acts taking place outside the limitations period." (quot-
ing County of Cook v. Berger, 648 F. Supp. 433, 435 (N.D. Ill. 1986))).
103. See supra text accompanying note 59. The justification of this rule lies in the fact that under
the ten year definition of pattern, plaintiff could only recover for those acts occurring within ten years
of the occurrence of the most recent act.
104. 667 F. Supp. 802 (M.D. Fla. 1987). For another case discussing but not adopting this rule,
see 5 Penn & Co. v. Shearson Lehman Bros., No. 87-1357, slip. op. (E.D. Pa. Nov. 3, 1987),
(WESTLAW DCT database) (dicta, as plaintiff's claim time barred under any theory of accrual
considered by court).
105. Comment, supra note 28, at 1418.
106. The method of accrual adopted by the Arnbrister court, termed the Clayton Act rule by this
Note, should be distinguished from the last predicate act rule, also an accrual method derived from the
Clayton Act. "This Court believes that the rationale of the Agency Holding decision requires an
application of the limitations accrual principles of the Clayton Act . . . ." Gilbert Family Partnership
v. Nido Corp., 679 F. Supp. 679, 686 (E.D. Mich. 1988) (applying last predicate act rule to civil
RICO accrual).
For the sake of convenience, the term "Clayton Act rule" is shorthand for the injury-on-the-
contract rule described herein. This terminology does not imply that the last predicate act rule is not
also derived from antitrust law. In a contract-based injury, rights are fixed at the time of signing, and
therefore the injury resulting from that particular distribution of rights is ascertainable and ripe.
Where injury is caused by some other type of relationship, such as the relationship between two
competitors, the injury resulting from each anticompetitive act is distinct. The latter situation is truly
an ongoing or continuous violation, whereas the contract-based injury is not. Thus, in the second
situation the continuing violation rule of accrual would apply, the cause of action would accrue from
the occurrence of the last predicate act in the series, and plaintiff could recover for injury suffered
from all such acts within the limitations period.
107. Arnbrister, 667 F. Supp. at 806.
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action generally accrues from the contract's date of execution. 08 The
Armbrister court, applying the rule of accrual specific to Clayton Act con-
tract cases, held that plaintiff's cause of action accrued upon the signing of
the contract, well outside the four year limitations period for RICO.1"9
The Clayton Act rule in Armbrister may be limited to its facts. No
other court has adopted this rule, perhaps because the discovery rule
works just as well, if not better, in the situation in which a plaintiff suf-
fers a single fraud injury."0 Moreover, the court derived its rule not from
a general consideration of RICO and other Federal policies, but from the
particular facts of the transaction. Presumably, the same court would have
applied another rule of accrual for a non-contract injury."'
B. The Optimal Rule for Accrual of a RICO Action
The discussion of the various rules has shown that two competing char-
acterizations of RICO exist. The first characterization views RICO as an
action to recover damages for several individual injuries. As many of these
individual injuries are fraud, the discovery rule should determine accrual.
The second view holds that RICO is primarily an action to recover for a
continuing violation.
RICO's pattern requirement is the foundation of this second under-
standing of RICO. This view can be justified on at least two other
grounds. First, Congress intended the RICO cause of action to combat
what it perceived to be an increasingly serious phenomenon: the infiltra-
tion of legitimate businesses by organized crime with money gleaned from
those associations' ill-gotten gains." 2 The pattern requirement was there-
fore intended to exclude from the RICO cause of action those plaintiffs
experiencing isolated threats. Second, the Supreme Court has focused on
the pattern requirement as a means of interpreting the statute and has
concluded that implicit in the definition of pattern is continuity or the
threat of continuity."' An accrual rule must allow plaintiff a chance to
demonstrate continuity.
At the same time, characterizing the claim primarily as an action to
recover for a continuing violation shifts the focus of the RICO action
away from the nature of the specific racketeering acts, many of which
involve fraud. Federal jurisprudence requires application of the discovery
108. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Sales, Inc. v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 677 F.2d 1045 (5th Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1105 (1983); Aurora Enters., Inc. v. Nat'l Broadcasting Co., 688 F.2d
689 (9th Cir. 1982).
109. Annbrister, 667 F. Supp. at 809.
110. See %upra text accompanying note 69.
111. For further discussion of the Clayton Act rule, see Comment, supra note 28, at 1411,
1418-20, 1431, 1432-33 (predicting Clayton Act rule to receive wide recognition after Agency
Holding).
112. See Bradley, supra note 47.
113. H.J., Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 109 S. Ct. 2893 (1989).
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rule in such actions."" Given the principles for determining accrual rules
developed in Part I requiring (1) characterization and (2) weighing any
other Federal jurisprudential or policy principles, the lst predicate act
discovery rule adopted by the Third Circuit seems the most sensible rule
for RICO accrual, although the court does not itself weigh these general
Federal principles in its decision. By running the statute of limitations
from the discovery of the last predicate act of the defendant, and by al-
lowing recovery for the entire pattern of injurious acts, the last predicate
act discovery rule recognizes the competing characterizations of RICO as
an action to recover for a continuing violation and as an action to recover
for injury caused by fraud. This method of accrual also maintains a bal-
ance of plaintiffs' and defendants' rights, as it limits recovery to those acts
falling within the meaning of "pattern," which by definition cannot occur
more than ten years before the last predicate act.
III. CONCLUSION
Because it accounts for the two competing characterizations of RICO
while maintaining a balance between plaintiffs' and defendants' rights, the
last predicate act discovery rule provides the best solution to the complex
problem of determining when a RICO cause of action accrues. Moreover,
courts, even those that have previously used other accrual methods in
RICO actions, may freely adopt a new rule.
Accrual of an action based on a Federal statute is a flexible concept. As
this discussion has shown, distinctions among the various rules become
blurred as courts try to cope with various factual situations that arise
under new statutes. For example, the discovery rule was originally ap-
plied narrowly." 5 Now the discovery rule governs most Federally created
causes of action, regardless of whether these actions involve fraud."' Anti-
trust actions originally accrued with the occurrence of the injurious act. 17
Now the rules of antitrust accrual allow the separate accrual of causes of
action, in the case of a continuing violation, and apply a form of the dis-
covery rule, in the tolling doctrine of fraudulent concealment.
Resolving uniformly when a RICO action accrues offers both parties
and courts some needed certainty, and provides courts with an opportunity
to limit the RICO action without an explicit rewriting of the statute's
terms. Of the several rules developed here, the last predicate act discovery
rule nicely balances the policy justifications for the RICO statute with the
Federal equitable interests in allowing plaintiffs time to discover their in-
juries, and in an even distribution of plaintiffs' and defendants' rights.
114. See supra text accompanying notes 52-55.
115. See supra note 53.
116. See supra note 65.
117. See 54 C.J.S., supra note 44, § 203.
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